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The Plight of the Derivative
Plaintiff: Justice Carter’s
Dissent in Hogan v. Ingold
By Michele Benedetto Neitz*
Introduction
The early years of the twenty-first century were plagued by an unprece-
dented number of scandals involving management of American corporations.
Dubious accounting practices, designed to conceal corporate mismanagement
and fraud, ultimately led to crises for numerous American companies, in-
cluding Tyco International Inc., Adelphia Communications Co., and World-
Com Inc.1 Many of the corporate officers involved in illegal and unethical
activities were convicted and sentenced to extensive prison terms.2 The most
famous scandal of this era was undoubtedly the collapse of Enron Corporation
in November 2001, which was quickly followed by the related collapse of Enron’s
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, LLP.3
Individual shareholders, in these companies and others, were outraged by
arrogant and egregious behavior on the part of corporate officers and direc-
tors. In addition to widespread business failures leading to the losses of bil-
lions of dollars, these corporate scandals facilitated a loss of public confidence
12 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:13 PM Page 169
170 THE PLIGHT OF THE DERIVATIVE PLAINTIFF
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
5. Hogan v. Ingold, 38 Cal. 2d 802 (1952). Although Clarence Hogan died while litiga-
tion was pending, Gladys Hogan, as executrix of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Id.
Because Clarence Hogan served as the original plaintiff, this comment will use the mascu-
line pronoun to refer to the plaintiff in Hogan v. Ingold.
6. 9 Witkin, Summary 10th (2005) Corp., §170, p. 942.
in the American corporate structure. As the media vocalized the public outcry,
lawmakers rapidly responded to the corporate governance disasters with the en-
actment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, a law intended to protect investors
by creating more accountability for corporate managers.4 In the meantime,
shareholders sought to remedy their losses through legal channels. With the cur-
rent renewed attention to the ability of individual shareholders to monitor cor-
porate governance, Justice Jesse Carter’s focus on the substantive rights of
shareholders renders his dissent inHogan v. Ingold particularly relevant today.
Like many derivative plaintiffs, Clarence Hogan was a shareholder in a cor-
poration that was allegedly suffering from mismanagement and fraud on the
part of the corporation’s officers and directors. In 1952, Hogan filed a deriv-
ative suit on behalf of Washington Holding Company (“Washington”) against
Washington’s officers and directors, alleging conspiracy “to acquire all the prop-
erty of Washington to the exclusion of the other shareholders.”5
Written over fifty years ago, Justice Carter’sHogan dissent championed the
rights of individuals with corporate investments to sue dishonest corporate of-
ficials through derivative lawsuits. His emphasis on justice and fairness for
shareholders established Justice Carter as a visionary in the area of corporate
ethics. Unfortunately, as the scandals of the modern era have demonstrated,
many of Justice Carter’s concerns for shareholders remain justified.
Derivative Lawsuits
A shareholder with personal claims against a corporation has the right to sue
a corporation or its officers directly to enforce those personal claims. In addi-
tion to these “direct suits,” the law allows a shareholder to bring or defend an
action on behalf of a corporation in “exceptional cases,” when the corpora-
tion’s officers or directors fail to act.6 In many cases, as in the Enron scandal,
those persons officially designated to act on behalf of the corporation (such
as members of the board of directors or other corporate officers) are respon-
sible for the fraud or mismanagement. However, in their capacity as decision-
makers for the corporate entity, the corporate officers often elect not to sue in
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7. See Hogan, 38 Cal. 2d at 817–18 (Carter, J., dissenting); see alsoHamilton, et al., supra
note 2 at 583–84.
8. Deigoudar v. Meyercord, 108 Cal. App. 4th 173, 183 (6th Dist 2003), following
Gagnon Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 452–53 (1955).
9. Larry E. Ribstein et al., Business Associations, §10.01[B] (4th Ed. 2003).
10. SarahWells, Maintaining Standing in a Shareholder Derivative Action, 38 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 343, 347 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881); see alsoWells, supra note 11, at
347–48. Among those circumstances required by the Supreme Court to exist as the foun-
dation of a derivative suit were [1] “Some action or threatened action of the managing
board of directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred
on them by their charter or other source of organization; [2] Or such a fraudulent trans-
action completed or contemplated by the acting managers, in connection with some other
party, or among themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in serious injury to the
corporation, or to the interests of the other shareholders; [3] Or where the board of direc-
tors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of
the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders; [4] Or where the major-
ity of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name
of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of other shareholders, and which can
only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity.” See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460.
the corporation’s own name to recover losses.7 In such instances, the burden
to sue and recover such losses for the corporation falls on the shareholders
themselves.
Such lawsuits are called “derivative actions,” because the rights of the plaintiff
shareholders to sue on behalf of the corporation “derive from the primary cor-
porate right to redress the wrongs against it.”8 Derivative plaintiffs are often in-
dividual shareholders suing corporate officials as derivative defendants. As such,
plaintiffs in derivative suits frequently litigate on uneven playing fields, operating
with fewer economic resources than wealthy corporate defendants. Because the
derivative plaintiff’s claim belongs to the corporation, any damages are usually paid
to the corporation rather than the shareholders individually.9 However, plaintiffs
could benefit if share prices increase as a result of successful derivative litigation.
While derivative lawsuits have gained prominence in today’s post-Enron
era, the modern form of American derivative litigation developed during the
mid-nineteenth century.10 In spite of the obvious need for a shareholder rem-
edy in cases of corporate mismanagement, early courts were concerned about
the possibility of abuse by minority shareholders “trying to usurp the directors’
decision making role.”11 In response to these concerns, the United States Supreme
Court in 1881 set forth circumstances necessary for shareholder plaintiffs to pro-
ceed in a derivative suit in federal court.12 These rules were codified in 1938 in
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13. Wells, supra note 11, at 348; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (2007).
14. Id.
15. The statute became effective on December 9, 1949, and established requirements
for the bringing of a derivative suit. See Hogan, 38 Cal. 2d at 805. Today in California, Cor-
porations Code §800 outlines the requirements for shareholder derivative actions. See Cal.
Corp. Code §800 (2007).
16. Id. at 805 n.1 (citing Cal. Corp. Code §834(a)(1) (Stats. 1949, ch. 499, §1)).
17. Id. (citing Cal. Corp. Code §834(a)(2)). Alternatively, a shareholder may allege the
reason for failure to give notice. Id.
18. Id. (citing Cal. Corp. Code §834(b)(1)–(2)).
19. Id. (citing Cal. Corp. Code §834(b)(2)).
20. Robert W. Hamilton, et al., Corporations, (5th Ed. 2006) at 615. Some older secu-
rity-for-expenses statutes turned on the size of the derivative plaintiffs’ holdings in the cor-
poration. Id. at 616. For example, a statute might require a plaintiff to post
security-for-expenses unless her holding represented more than 5% of the corporation’s
stock, or exceeded a market value of $25,000. Id. Such statutes were clearly designed to dis-
courage derivative lawsuits by limiting the identities of derivative plaintiffs. Id. In Califor-
nia, however, the value or percentage of a plaintiff ’s holdings of stock in the corporation
“has no bearing on the issue” regarding whether there is a reasonable probability that the
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 1966, Rule 23.1 was created
to treat derivative suits separately from other class action suits.13
As the federal rules developed regarding derivative suits, states also created
their own statutory provisions addressing such cases. Thirty-three states have
developed unique statutory provisions addressing derivative lawsuits.14
One particularly important element of derivative actions is the issue of stand-
ing to bring and maintain such an action. Nearly sixty years ago, the California
state legislature established requirements for the bringing of a derivative suit with
the creation of Cal. Corp. Code §834.15 These requirements included a “con-
temporaneous ownership requirement,”mandating that a derivative plaintiff al-
lege he or she was a shareholder at the time of the wrongdoing, or acquired shares
from someone who was a registered shareholder at that time.16 In addition, the
statute codified a “demand requirement,” providing that a derivative plaintiff
must allege efforts to obtain action from the board of directors, and must pro-
vide notice to the corporation or the board of directors of the facts of the case.17
The third condition mandated by §834 was a “security-for-expenses” re-
quirement. On the motion of a defendant, the court could require a derivative
plaintiff to provide security for the probable reasonable expenses of the cor-
poration and individual defendants, including attorneys’ fees.18 A plaintiff ’s
failure to furnish security within a reasonable time would result in dismissal
of the action.19 Security-for-expenses provisions are designed to deter deriva-
tive actions, since “plaintiffs may be unable or unwilling to post security.”20
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action will benefit the corporation or its shareholders. Suburban Water Systems v. Superior
Court for County of L.A., 264 Cal. App. 2d. 956, 961 (1968).







The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of security-for-
expenses provisions in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.21
Despite the California legislature’s attempt to specifically delineate require-
ments for derivative suits, several gaps relating to the application of §834 were
left to be determined by the courts. In 1952, the California Supreme Court
addressed §834’s contemporaneous ownership requirement and security-for-
expenses requirement in Hogan v. Ingold.
Themajority opinion outlined the underlying facts of the case.22 Plaintiff Hogan
had purchased shares in theWashington Holding Company in 1949, and sub-
sequently became concerned that members of the board of directors had en-
gaged in fraud.
Hogan’s allegations of fraudulent activity committed by Washington’s offi-
cers and directors may appear strikingly familiar to individuals living in today’s
post-Enron era. Among other things, Hogan accused the defendants of issu-
ing false financial statements on behalf of the company, leasing company prop-
erty to organizations under defendants’ control for less than its market rental
value (and subsequently failing to collect rental payments), and providing a
lease with an option to purchase at below-market value to an organization
controlled by defendants.23 With the exception of the third of these allegations,
all alleged acts of fraud occurred before Hogan became a shareholder.24 Sig-
nificantly, all alleged acts of fraud also occurred before Cal. Corp. Code §834
went into effect in December 1949.25
After Hogan’s complaint was filed, several of the defendants moved for an
order requiring Hogan to furnish security-for-expenses in accordance with
§834. The trial court agreed with defendants that plaintiff Hogan had not ful-
filled the contemporaneous ownership requirement of §834, and therefore
Hogan could not establish a “reasonable probability” that prosecution of his ac-
tion would benefit Washington or its shareholders.26 With this reasoning, the
court in effect determined that Hogan was not a proper plaintiff under §834,
and ordered Hogan to furnish security-for-expenses as provided by the statute.27
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28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 805. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether §834 could be ap-
plied to a derivative suit “commenced after the effective date of the statute, but concerning
wrongs allegedly committed before” the effective date of §834, when such suit was brought
by a shareholder who acquired stock “otherwise than by operation of law” and at a time
after the wrongs were committed but before enactment of the statute. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 808.
33. Id. at 810.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also id. at 812. The Court explained: “The stockholder does not bring such
a suit because his rights had been directly violated, or because the cause of action is his or
because he is entitled to the relief sought. He is permitted to sue in this manner simply in
Despite the court’s directive, Hogan did not furnish security-for-expenses.
As a result, the court dismissed Hogan’s action in accordance with the re-
quirements of §834.28 When the appellate court upheld the trial court’s order
requiring security-for-expenses, Hogan appealed to the California Supreme
Court. In the Supreme Court, Hogan argued that his status as a plaintiff suing
derivatively was a substantial property right. Hogan further argued that im-
posing §834’s conditions in this case gave the statute “retroactive effect” de-
priving Hogan of a “valuable property right.”29
Hence, there were two issues facing the California Supreme Court inHogan
v. Ingold. First, the court was asked to consider the timing of applying §834 to
derivative suits.30 Depending on that determination, the court needed to de-
cide whether applying §834 in such a case would deprive a derivative shareholder
plaintiff of a vested property right.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that §834 was a proce-
dural statute applied prospectively, not retroactively, and its application did
not divest the plaintiff of any substantive vested right.31 The majority began
its analysis with the observation that application of §834 did not prevent Hogan
from continuing his derivative lawsuit; it merely required that he furnish se-
curity in order to proceed further with this litigation.32 The majority analo-
gized the role of a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative lawsuit to a guardian ad
litem, standing as “the representative of some person incompetent to sue or
be sued directly.”33 Because a shareholder suing derivatively is not suing for
herself, but rather is suing for the corporation, she “cannot even be consid-
ered a party to the cause.”34 Accordingly, a shareholder plaintiff suing deriva-
tively does not possess any “property right” of her own, but rather is simply
representing the rights of the corporation.35
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order to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court.” Id. at 809 (citing Whitten v.
Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 630–31 (1915)).
36. Id. at 812.
37. See Hogan, 38 Cal. 2d at 812.
38. Id. at 816.
39. Id. at 818 (Carter, J., dissenting).
Since the majority found that §834 did not affect any substantive rights of
shareholders, it held §834 was a procedural statute.36 Citing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s declaration in Cohen that “it is within the power of a state to close its
doors” to derivative litigation, the majority held that derivative litigation could
be subject to the type of procedural regulation intended by California’s §834.37
This determination supported the majority’s conclusion that Hogan did not
have a vested property right as a derivative plaintiff, and the majority thus af-
firmed the order of the lower courts that Hogan post security-for-expenses.38
With this decision, the majority failed to consider the broader view of justice
for victims of corporate misconduct. The court instead threw procedural road-
blocks into the path of an individual shareholder attempting to remedy corporate
fraud.
Justice Carter wrote the opinion for the three dissenting judges. Justice
Carter’s opinion was grounded in a fundamental difference from the majority
view: Justice Carter believed a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative suit pos-
sessed a “substantial property right.”39 Justice Carter also recognized the bur-
den of imposing security-for-expenses requirements on individual plaintiffs.
Accordingly, Justice Carter disapproved of the majority’s guardian ad litem
analogy, and raised constitutional concerns which were unresolved by the ma-
jority opinion.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
The main question presented is whether section 834 of the Corporations
Code is to be applied to past transactions, that is, retroactively, as in the case
at bar. That section requires two things prerequisite to the maintenance of a
derivative action by a corporation shareholder: (1) That he be a registered
stockholder at the time the fraudulent transaction occurred and at the time of
the commencement of the action, and (2) that he post security guaranteeing
the payment of the expenses of the defense of the suit if he is unsuccessful.
Before discussing the main issue certain pertinent principles should be clar-
ified inasmuch as the majority opinion either casts serious doubt upon them
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or repudiates them. The right to bring such an action is the established law of
this state and elsewhere, except under the rules of procedure of the federal
court, whether the shareholder was or was not a registered owner when the
fraud was committed. It is a substantial right whether it be called procedural,
property or otherwise. It is the only method whereby the fraud of the corpo-
ration management may be exposed and restitution obtained, contrary to the
intimation of the majority opinion. In an attempt to ameliorate the serious
consequence of its holding, the majority make the following highly mislead-
ing statements: “Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of action, are still
free to sue the corporation, the majority stockholders, or the directors of the
corporation, and to recover for any cause they can establish. . . Plaintiff ’s stock
is still his; any personal rights of action he may possess as attributes or inci-
dents of the stock are still his and, as already noted, are completely unaffected
by section 834.” There can be no doubt that the majority is fully cognizant of
the fact that there is no other remedy or cause of action known to the law avail-
able to obtain the relief sought, other than the one here involved. Historically
speaking the remedy here sought is equitable, as will appear from the discus-
sion to follow.
The majority cite and quote at some length from Whitten v. Dabney, 171
Cal. 621, 154 P. 312, relative to the capacity of a plaintiff in a so-called deriv-
ative action on behalf of a corporation and emphasis is placed upon the anal-
ogy made in that case between such a plaintiff and a guardian ad litem in the
ordinary civil action. While this analogy strikes me as being inappropriate for
obvious reasons, I can see no basis for resorting to terminology in order to
impair plaintiff ’s right to prosecute a derivative action. It should be apparent
that the analogy between a plaintiff in a derivative action and a guardian ad litem
is wholly unrealistic as there is no requirement whatever that a guardian ad
litem have any interest directly or indirectly in the subject matter or outcome
directly in the subject matter or outcome place of the plaintiff who lacks ca-
pacity to prosecute the action in his own name. Such is not the case when a cor-
poration is in control of officers who have committed frauds which have resulted
in pecuniary loss to its stockholders. There is no incapacity on the part of such
corporation to seek redress for the loss sustained as the result of the fraudu-
lent conduct of its officers, but the officers guilty of the fraud will not permit
the corporation to sue in its own name to recover for the loss sustained. Hence,
a stockholder who has indirectly suffered such loss in common with the other
stockholders has the right to prosecute such an action on behalf of himself and
those similarly affected, including the corporation. Such right is a substantial
property right as it may have the effect of substantially increasing the value of
the shares of stock owned by the plaintiff by virtue of requiring the defraud-
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ing officers to return to the corporation the portion of its assets which they
have misappropriated or misused to the detriment of not only the corpora-
tion but the shareholders thereof. While it is true as stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69
S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528, that the plaintiff in such an action assumes a posi-
tion of a fiduciary character, this does not mean that so far as his own inter-
ests are concerned, he is not acting for himself. The fiduciary capacity in which
he serves is with relation to the corporation and the other stockholders whose
interests he is seeking to advance in common with his own.
The rule here involved is stated in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations with
supporting authorities: “In several of the states the rule is well settled that a
stockholder may sue although he purchased his shares after the transaction
complained of. And it is generally held immaterial that he purchased for the
purpose of acquiring the right to sue. A subsequent stockholder cannot re-
cover, however, even under this majority rule, (1) when he is not a bona fide
stockholder, or (2) when himself guilty of acquiescence in the wrong, or (3)
when himself guilty of laches, or (4) where the transferor of the stock would
have been barred from bringing suit by laches or acquiescence or the like.”
(Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, (Perm. Ed.) §5980.) The opposing view
is chiefly represented by federal cases which are controlled by a rule of proce-
dure (Fed.Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 23(b)) similar to section 834. (Fletcher Cy-
clopedia Corporations, (Perm. Ed.) § 5981.) The majority rule has been
established in this state. (citations omitted). In [Harvey v. Meigs, 17 Cal.App.
353, 364 (1911)] the court said. . . “However this may be, both plaintiffs in any
view have, on the showing made in the complaint, a right to prevent the pay-
ment of the fraudulent credits shown to stand on the company’s books in favor
of defendants. And if the defendants have without consideration and fraudu-
lently appropriated $94,000 of the corporate funds which should be restored
to its treasury, I fail to see why they have not a cause of action to compel such
return even though they acquired their shares after such misappropriation. See
the question fully considered in Just v. Idaho Canal Irr. Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102
P. 381, 133 Am.St.Rep. 140 (1909).” The majority opinion fails to point out
any sound reason why a transferee of stock should not receive any rights of ac-
tion incidental to ownership of the stock which the transferor had. There is
no reason for doubting the soundness of the rule, for otherwise there is a grave
question of discrimination. If a transferee cannot sue because he did not own
stock when the fraud occurred, it would logically follow that if some qualified
stockholder sued and recovered, the stock of the transferee could not benefit
by the recovery. The benefit would have to go to his transferor. No one would
advocate such a proposition. Hence it must follow that when the stock is trans-
12 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:13 PM Page 177
178 THE PLIGHT OF THE DERIVATIVE PLAINTIFF
ferred, the transfer carries with it the right to recover on behalf of the corpo-
ration for past frauds perpetrated by its officers. An expert in corporation law
agrees that it is “. . . a sound rule on principle as each share represents an in-
terest in the entire concern and the several shareholders are entitled to equal
rights irrespective of when they acquired their shares. The corporate cause of
action is enforced for the benefit of all the shareholders.” (Ballantine, Abuses
of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far is California’s New ‘Security for Ex-
penses’ Act Sound Regulation? 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399, 414 (1949).)
Further, in this connection, and also pointing out the substantial character
of the right, the United States Supreme Court has this to say in speaking of
similar but less drastic New Jersey legislation than our section 834: “As busi-
ness enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorporation, manage-
ment became vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling other people’s
money. The vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to
be drawn to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered holders of
small interests. The director was not subject to an effective accountability. That
created strong temptation for managers to profit personally at expense of their
trust. The business code became all too tolerant of such practices. Corporate laws
were lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders, in face of gravest abuses,
were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust.
“Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to bring
civil action at law against faithless directors and managers. Equity, however, al-
lowed him to step into the corporation’s shoes and to seek in its right the resti-
tution he could not demand in his own. It required him first to demand that
the corporation vindicate its own rights but when, as was usual, those who
perpetrated the wrongs also were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear
and adjudge the corporation’s cause through its stockholder with the corpo-
ration as a defendant, albeit a rather nominal one. This remedy born of stock-
holder helplessness was long the chief regulator of corporate management and
has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stock-
holders’ interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there
would be little practical check on such abuses.” (Italics added.) Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949). And, speaking of the statutory re-
quirement for security for expenses, 337 U.S. at page 555: “However, it creates
a new liability where none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who insti-
tutes a derivative action liable for the expense to which he puts the corpora-
tion and other defendants, if he does not make good his claims. Such liability
is not usual and it goes beyond payment of what we know as ‘costs.’ If all the Act
did was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But this new lia-
bility would be without meaning and value in many cases if it resulted in noth-
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ing but a judgment for expenses at or after the end of the case. Therefore, a pro-
cedure is prescribed by which the liability is insured by entitling the corporate
defendant to a bond of indemnity before the outlay is incurred. We do not
think a statute which so conditions the stockholder’s action can be disregarded by
the federal court as a mere procedural device.” (Italics added.)
In the face of those salutary and established principles the majority opin-
ion arrives at the conclusion that section 834 was intended to apply to past
transactions because, as to the expense security requirement, it is mere pro-
cedure, a proposition squarely contrary to the Cohen case, which holds that
the requirement is more than for costs. That the statute would be given retroac-
tive application in the instant case is clear. The last word by this court on the
subject is that: “A retrospective law is one which affects rights, obligations,
acts, transactions and conditions which are performed or exist prior to the
adoption of the statute.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 30 Cal.2d 388, 391 (1947). There is by section 834 a requirement
that security be posted by the plaintiff in derivative actions, and the plaintiff
must have owned the stock when the fraud occurred. The right to maintain the
action by one who acquired stock after the perpetration of the fraud without
posting security for expenses both existed before section 834 was passed. If
that section is applied in this case those rights are being affected. The new law
is one, which in the language of the Aetna case, affects rights, obligations and
conditions which existed prior to its adoption. That is true of both the expense
and ownership requirements.
We thus come to the question of whether it was intended that section 834
should be applied retroactively. “It is an established canon of interpretation
that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made
to appear that such was the legislative intent. . . . It is contended upon behalf of
respondents that this rule of statutory construction has no application to pro-
cedural statutes, and that section 4661 relates solely to matters of procedure or
remedy. Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal.2d 482 (1938); City of Los Angeles v.
Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299, 283 P. 298 (1929); San Bernardino County v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 217 Cal. 618 (1933), and Davis & McMillan v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046 (1926), are relied upon
in support of the contention. In those cases, with one exception, it was held
that the language of the statutes showed that the Legislature intended them to
be applied retroactively, and the court was concerned mainly with the question
of whether the Legislature has power to give those laws such retroactive effect.
Since the question of the constitutionally of retroactive legislation and the
question of the applicability of a rule of statutory construction are distinct
(Ware v. Heller, 63 Cal.App.2d 817, 821 (1944)) these cases are not in point. .
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. . If substantial changes are made, even in a statute which might ordinarily be
classified as procedural, the operation on existing rights would be retroactive be-
cause the legal effects of past events would be changed, and the statute will be
construed to operate only in futuro unless the legislative intent to the contrary
clearly appears.” (Italics added.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission, 30 Cal.2d 388, 393 (1947). That the change in the law
wrought by the adoption of section 834 is substantial and does affect existing
rights is too obvious to require further discussion. True, section 834 states that
no action may be “instituted or maintained,” but that is not sufficient to abrogate
the rule that to be construed as retroactive in operation on substantial rights
a statute must clearly so state. In Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180, 61 N.E.2d
435 (1945), the court had before it a New York statute similarly phrased, which
required posting of security for costs if plaintiff in a derivative action owned
less than a specified percentage of stock. The court interpreted the statute as
not applicable to an action which was commenced before its adoption, and
while it mentioned a possible distinction between that situation and where the
action was commenced later, it emphasized the nature of the right affected as
substantial and invoked the rule of construction against retrospective opera-
tion, stating, 61 N.E.2d at page 440: ‘It is said that, when the Legislature pro-
vided that the defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give
security “in any action instituted or maintained in the right of any foreign or
domestic corporation,” it disclosed an intention that the statute should apply
not only in actions thereafter instituted but also in actions previously ‘insti-
tuted’ and thereafter maintained.’ The word ‘maintained’may be used in a con-
text where it clearly denotes that it includes pending actions. (Citation omitted).
In other context it has frequently been given other construction. (Citation
omitted). In the statute we are now construing it is at most equivocal and does
not, we think, disclose an intent of the Legislature that it should be applied in
actions previously instituted.”A reasonable interpretation is that the use of the
phraseology in section 834 that no action may be “instituted or maintained”
unless the stock ownership at the time of the transaction is alleged, and secu-
rity is posted if required, is merely another way of stating that a shareholder
has no right of action on behalf of the corporation unless those conditions
exist or are complied with. Such construction carries no retroactive implica-
tion. It does not necessarily point to an intent to have the statute operate on
accrued rights. . . .
Furthermore, it should be remembered that section 834 embraces the re-
quirement of shareholding at the time named as well as the requirement of se-
curity in one cohesive coverage regulating derivative actions. It is not to be
supposed that part of it is to be retroactive but not the remainder, the security
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mandate and stockholder prerequisite, for the first sentence purports to re-
quire all of the conditions to be on the same footing. There can be no doubt
that the stock ownership requirement would operate upon a prior accrued
right of vital importance.
In connection with the ownership requirement it should be observed that
the majority opinion does not discuss that phase of section 834, with refer-
ence to retroactivity. It holds the expense security requirement either is not
being applied retrospectively, or even if it is, that is a proper construction of
it. If such is true of that part of the section it must also be true of the owner-
ship requisite, unless it is said that the parts of the section are severable, a
problem heretofore mentioned by me but not even discussed in the majority
opinion. If the majority thinks there is severability, it need not discuss the
ownership feature. Otherwise it must.
The majority opinion endeavors to sidestep the ownership question by the
statement: “As previously mentioned, ... it was for failure to furnish the security
as ordered that the action was dismissed. Thus as applied here the statute did not
operate to absolutely preclude plaintiff frommaintaining the suit; it merely required
him to furnish the security if he were to proceed further in his fiduciary capac-
ity.” That is not true in any realistic sense. The majority concedes that the trial
court based its dismissal of the action solely upon the fact that plaintiff was not
an owner of stock when the fraud was committed. It was on that basis, and that
alone, that the expense security was ordered by the court. The dismissal followed
when the security was not furnished. But, nevertheless, it was in effect based
upon the lack of stock ownership. It is idle to reason, as does the majority, that
plaintiff was not injured because he could have posted the security and thus
avoided dismissal. If he had supplied it, he would have suffered the burden im-
posed by section 834, and his complaint would be subject to dismissal on general
demurrer for it shows that he was not an owner of stock when the fraud occurred.
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are grave questions of constitu-
tionality involving equal protection of the law which were not decided in Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., supra, 337 U.S. 541, in connection with the require-
ment that security be posted to cover expenses including attorneys’ fees and
that such expenses shall be allowed against the security if the action is unsuc-
cessful. A situation is presented where the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s
attorneys’ fees if unsuccessful, but the defendant is not required to pay plain-
tiff ’s counsel fees if the latter wins. Such a statute is invalid unless there is some
reason why plaintiffs are in a different position than defendants. [Citations
omitted]. It may be argued that because of the danger of spite suits, bad faith
suits, by stockholders in derivative actions it is proper to place those actions
in a separate class, but that cannot apply here. Under section 834 plaintiff is
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40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 817.
43. Id. at 818.
44. Id.
to post security for attorneys’ fees when it appears on the motion therefore
that the corporation would not benefit by the action. Suppose the court finds
the corporation would probably benefit by the action, then the corporation
should be required to post security for plaintiff ’s counsel fees, a wholly reasonable
demand because the corporation is the one that benefits by the recovery; the
action is on its behalf and ultimately for the good of all stockholders. Section
834 makes no such provision, however, and for that reason is strongly suspect
of denying equal protection of the law.
I would therefore reverse the order of the dismissal.
Comment
Justice Carter’s dissenting opinion demonstrates his concern for the plight
of the derivative plaintiff. While the majority viewed a derivative plaintiff as merely
a representative of the corporation, Justice Carter espoused the view that a
shareholder plaintiff has a great deal at stake in derivative litigation. After all,
simply because a shareholder chooses to sue in a fiduciary position “does not
mean that so far as his own interests are concerned, he is not acting for him-
self.”40 A derivative plaintiff may have chosen to represent the claims of the
corporation, but the “other stockholders whose interests he is seeking to ad-
vance” are “in common with his own [interests].”41
Thus, Justice Carter forcefully argued that the majority’s analogy between a
derivative plaintiff and a guardian ad litem was “inappropriate for obvious rea-
sons.”42 Unlike a guardian ad litem, who generally has no personal stake in the
case, a derivative plaintiff does indeed have an interest in the outcome of the lit-
igation. Because successful derivative litigation would require defrauding offi-
cers to returnmisappropriated or misused funds to the corporation, the litigation
would also substantially increase the value of shares owned by the plaintiff and
other shareholders.43 This increased value, declared Justice Carter, represents a
“substantial property right” possessed by a derivative plaintiff.44
With this proposition, Justice Carter sharply diverged from the majority
opinion. If the stake held by a derivative plaintiff was indeed a substantial
property right, applying §834’s security-for-expenses requirement to this case
12 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:13 PM Page 182
THE PLIGHT OF THE DERIVATIVE PLAINTIFF 183
45. Id. at 820, citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555.
46. Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 30 Cal. 2d 388
(1947)).
49. Id. at 822.
50. Id. at 823.
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improperly interfered with that right: “ . . . it creates a new liability where none
existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative action li-
able for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other defendants,
if he does not make good his claims.”45 Before §834 was established, Carter
argued, the “right to maintain [a derivative] action by one who acquired stock
after the perpetration of the fraud without posting security expenses” existed.46
Applying §834’s provisions substantively affects this right, and therefore Jus-
tice Carter concluded the statute cannot be deemed simply “procedural.”47
Following this line of reasoning, Justice Carter recognized that application of
a statute creating“substantial changes” to existing rights would be retroactive “be-
cause the legal effects of past events would be changed.”48 Here, the fact that adop-
tion of §834 substantially changed the law and affected existing rights was seen
byCarter as“too obvious to require discussion.”49 Indeed, inHogan’s case, application
of §834 effectively terminated his lawsuit. Unlike the majority, Justice Carter ap-
preciated the impact of §834’s provisions on the substantive rights of derivative
plaintiffs. His rights-based analysis foreshadowed the need for courts and legis-
latures to protect individual shareholders in the face of corporate executive greed.
Justice Carter also raised constitutional concerns inherent in the statute.
Since §834 required a derivative plaintiff to post expenses, including attor-
neys’ fees, and to pay such expenses if the action is unsuccessful, Justice Carter
recognized that “a situation is presented”whereby the plaintiff must pay the de-
fendant’s attorneys’ fees if unsuccessful, but “the defendant is not required to
pay plaintiff ’s counsel fees if the latter wins.”50 Without a valid justification for
placing plaintiffs in a different position than defendants, Justice Carter sus-
pected §834 of denying equal protection of the law.51 Here again, we witness
Justice Carter’s concern for the individual shareholder plaintiff David facing the
corporate officer Goliath. As Justice Carter reminds us, and as the Enron-era
scandals proved to us, failing to ensure the ability of derivative shareholders to
litigate on an equal footing with corporate officers and directors could violate
the very essence of our democratic structure. Derivative litigation provides an
effective checks-and-balances structure to deter corporate officers from abus-
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52. Cal. Corp. Code §800, Legislative Committee Comment 1975—Assembly (Cor-
rected) (2007).
53. Cal. Corp. Code §800 (b)(1).
54. Id. Specifically, §800(b)(1) provides that a plaintiff seeking to bring a derivative suit in
California who cannotmeet the statute’s contemporaneous ownership requirements may show
on motion and after a hearing, at which the court shall consider such evidence,
by affidavit or testimony, as it deems material, that (i) there is a strong prima
facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation, (ii) no other
similar action has been or is likely to be instituted, (iii) the plaintiff acquired the
shares before there was disclosure to the public or to the plaintiff of the wrong-
doing of which plaintiff complains, (iv) unless the action can be maintained the
defendant may retain a gain derived from defendant’s willful breach of a fiduci-
ary duty, and (v) the requested relief will not result in unjust enrichment of the
corporation or any shareholder of the corporation.
The plaintiff must also allege plaintiff ’s efforts to secure action from the board (or rea-
son for not making an effort), and show notice of the lawsuit was given to each defendant
and the corporation. Cal. Corp. Code §800(b)(2).
55. SeeWells, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 351.
56. The California Supreme Court recently narrowed the stockholder ownership re-
quirements for derivative suits in the context of a lack of “continuous ownership.” Grosset
ing their power; without such litigation, individual shareholders would be se-
verely limited in their efforts to combat corporate misconduct.
Subsequent developments in California law relating to derivative lawsuits ac-
knowledge some, but not all, of Justice Carter’s concerns. Section 834 was re-
pealed by the California legislature in 1975, but its provisions are now codified
in §800 of the California Corporations Code. As part of the 1975 amendments,
the legislature relaxed the contemporaneous ownership requirement to “avoid
the harsh results sometimes encountered in the application” of this require-
ment.52 Under current law, a shareholder who does not meet the contempora-
neous ownership requirements may “nevertheless be allowed in the discretion
of the court” to maintain a derivative action in particular circumstances.53 To
do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate one of several factors, such as showing that
a strong prima facie case exists in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the cor-
poration, or establishing that no similar action has been or is likely to be as-
serted.54 By providing specific exceptions to the contemporaneous ownership rule,
California attempted to “both expand the number of plaintiffs eligible for stand-
ing and prevent the misuse that courts fear when a derivative lawsuit is filed.”55
California’s more liberal modern exceptions to this requirement may have allowed
Hogan, whose suit was dismissed when he did not post security after failing to
pass §834’s contemporaneous ownership requirement, to move forward as a
derivative plaintiff today against the Washington Holding Company.56
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v. Wenaas, 42 Cal. 4th 1100 (2008). If a shareholder ceases to be a shareholder in the mid-
dle of a derivative suit, whether voluntarily through a sale or involuntarily through a merger
(as in the Grosset case), that shareholder loses standing to proceed as a derivative plaintiff.
Id. at 1119. The Grosset court noted that a shareholder in such circumstances no longer has
a “dog in the hunt.” Id. at 1114.
57. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank of California, N.A. v. Paquet, 98 Cal. App. 4th 468, 474–75
(2002) (citing Hogan, court found that derivative plaintiffs were not “actual parties to the
[derivative] complaint,” and therefore the pendency of a derivative suit did not prevent a judg-
ment from being final as to the shareholder’s direct claims).
58. Cal. Corp. Code §800(c)–(d).
59. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, “Enron—The Primer,” Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Im-
plications 3, Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, eds., (2003).
Although Justice Carter would undoubtedly be pleased by California’s more
expansive approach to the ownership requirement for derivative plaintiffs, his
concerns relating to the security-for-expenses provision of the state statute
have fallen on deaf ears. The Hogan majority’s analogy between derivative
plaintiffs and guardians ad litem is often cited by modern courts struggling to
define the roles of shareholder plaintiffs.57 Moreover, the current version of
§800 preserves the right of a derivative defendant to require a plaintiff to fur-
nish a bond, up to $50,000, for reasonable expenses (including attorneys’ fees)
which may be incurred by the corporation or defendants.58 Defendants are not
required to post this security. Thus, although some of the issues highlighted
in Justice Carter’s dissent have been subsequently addressed, derivative plain-
tiffs remain subject to the deterring effects of security-for-expenses statutes.
Conclusion
Justice Carter’s concern for individual shareholder plaintiffs is especially
significant in the post-Enron era. Considering the tendency of some modern
corporate managers to operate from a “ ‘what can I get away with?’ perspec-
tive,” the rights of shareholders to sue for recovery of losses has become in-
creasingly important.59 If Justice Carter’s vision of a rights-based approach for
derivative plaintiffs could be realized, individual rights would be strengthened
and access to justice for derivative plaintiffs would be assured. In this way,
more individuals would feel comfortable investing in corporate structures, and
public confidence in corporate America would likely be considerably improved.
Although Justice Carter could not have imagined the shocking events of mod-
ern corporate scandals, his dissent inHogan v. Ingold inspires us to protect the
substantive rights of shareholders as we strive to eliminate corporate fraud.
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